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Will Aging Baby Boomers Bust the
Federal Budget?
Ronald Lee and Jonathan Skinner

B

arely ten years from now, the leading edge of the baby boom generation
will turn 65, ushering in a sustained aging of the U.S. population. Many
are concerned that through the first half of the 21st century, the federal
government will stagger under the weight of these elderly baby boomers as they
receive the medical, retirement, and disability benefits promised them. The number
of people over age 65 in the population is projected to increase by a factor of 2.5
by 2040 (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994), with the number of nursing home residents
growing even more rapidly (Schneider and Guralnick, 1990). Long-term forecasts
suggest that nearly one-third of GDP will be accounted for by health care by 2030
(Burner, Waldo and McKusick, 1992; Warshawsky, 1994). The fiscal impact of this
demographic change is potentially enormous (Shoven, Topper and Wise, 1994).
An alternative view is much more optimistic about retirement prospects for
the baby boom generation. This view holds that disability and morbidity will continue to become more compressed, leading to healthier years later in life (Manton,
Stallard and Liu, 1993b; Manton, Corder and Stallard, 1997). The average retirement age will rise. Productivity gains and increased tax revenue will offset the demands that aging baby boomers place on the federal budget. One projection suggests the percentage of those over age 65 requiring Medicaid coverage for longterm care will decline in the next century (Wiener, Illston and Hanley, 1994).
Another is that long-term health care costs will decline as a fraction of median
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income (Zedlewski and McBride, 1992). As a Business Week cover story (Farrell, 1994,
p. 68) concluded, ‘‘The elderly are more vital than before. Americans can afford
to grow old. And they will grow old gracefully.’’
Figuring out which of these two scenarios is most likely is crucial for forming
policies in preparation for the retirement of the baby boomers. If the baby boomers
are likely to cause severe problems for the federal budget in the next century, then
assessing costs on them now, while they are still working, clearly makes more sense
than changing policies after they have already retired. Conversely, a government
cure for a nonexistent problem could disrupt the saving and retirement plans of
the generations it was designed to help.
But knowing which basic scenario is correct is a difficult task. First, we must
know how long the baby boom generation will live. Will life expectancies continue
to rise at rates observed in the past? Possible alternatives are that either we bump
up against an intrinsic biomedical ceiling to longevity, or that we are on the threshold of dramatic gains in longevity as a result of breakthroughs arising from medical
advances and healthier lifestyles.
A second tier of questions goes beyond years of life to consider what kind of
life. Will the elderly in the next century live with the disabling after-effects of strokes
and heart disease, or will the future elderly be healthier as a result of having avoided
disease at younger ages? These trends in health and disability will strongly influence
retirement decisions, and perhaps most importantly for government budgets, the
demand for health care resources.
A third cluster of issues surrounds the evolving technology of health care,
which will surely exert a strong influence on health care costs. Will technological
change take the form of ever-more expensive interventions targeted not just to
those who are sick, but preventive (and expensive) procedures for the enormous
reservoir of those who might become sick? Or will health care evolve towards strategies that could yield cost savings, such as the use of cholesterol-reducing drugs
that can attenuate future surgical expenses (Johannesson, 1997)?
The sociologist Richard Suzman (as quoted in Roush, 1996) once said about
predictions of life expectancy, health, and disability, ‘‘Anyone who gives you firm
prognostications about what is going to happen is either a liar or a fool . . .’’ We
wish to avoid being lumped into either of these categories. Nevertheless, in what
follows we will venture some general answers to the questions raised above. We find
that the prospects for longevity are considerably brighter than currently expected
by the Social Security Administration. This is good news for the baby boomers and
only modestly bad news for the Social Security trust fund since more people are
also expected to survive through the working ages, meaning a larger-than-expected
number of taxpayers in the future. But there is considerable uncertainty about the
state of the Social Security trust fund; stochastic simulations for the year 2070 show
a 95 percent confidence interval with a range of $54 trillion!
The good news about longevity is not necessarily bad news for the long-term
health of the Medicare trust fund. Once past the current impending crisis in
Medicare—which is really the problem of the baby boomers’ parents—we believe
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that the greater number of people dying at older ages (with the resulting lower
associated costs of the terminally ill) will largely offset the direct impact on Medicare
spending of more elderly people (Lubitz, Beebe and Baker, 1995; Miller, 1998).
The greatest source of uncertainty about future Medicare spending is the course
of medical technology. We suspect that real growth (as a fraction of GDP) will
continue in the long-term, but at considerably slower rates than those projected by
some government agencies.
As noted above, there is a tremendous degree of uncertainty about demographic and economic projections. Thus the many proposals to ‘‘fix’’ Social Security
and Medicare in expected value terms can still result in empty trust funds should
the projections be wrong. For example, one proposed fix—an immediate 2 percentage point increase in the Social Security payroll tax—still leaves a 75 percent
chance of the Social Security trust fund going bankrupt before 2070 (Lee and
Tuljapurkar, 1998a, b). Whatever the nature of reform that takes place in this century, the government should prepare for the possibility of a major Social Security
and Medicare bust (or bonanza) in the next century.

Mortality Decline: How Fast and How Far?
The total U.S. population is predicted to increase by about two-thirds between
now and 2070. But in this same time, the population over 65 will triple, and the
population over 85 will increase by a factor of eight (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994).
The old age dependency ratio—that is, the population aged 65 and over divided
by the working age population aged 20 to 64—is a convenient measure of population aging. In judging the fiscal viability of Social Security and Medicare, this is
obviously a crucial ratio, since it approximates the ratio of people receiving benefits
(the numerator) over the people paying into the system (the denominator). Figure
1 plots this ratio. The middle line is the point estimate, while the upper and lower
lines show a 95 percent probability interval from a new kind of stochastic population
projection by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994, p. 1185; described in the Appendix). The
old age dependency ratio rises steeply between 2010 and 2030 as the baby boom
generations turn 65. By 2070, the old age dependency ratio is projected to more
than double, to 0.47, but the gap around the central estimate is fairly wide, with
the 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 0.26 to 0.68.
Much of the uncertainty derives from the unknown course of fertility, since
sustained low fertility leads to old populations. Since the 1970s, U.S. women have
averaged 1.8 to 2.0 children each. Women in Europe average 1.4 children each;
Spain and Italy both have about 1.2 births per woman. If U.S. fertility were to move
toward the rest of the industrialized world, aging would be much more rapid than
currently projected. The fertility of immigrants and minorities contributes to higher
fertility in the United States, but the fertility of non-Hispanic whites at 1.8 births
per woman is itself substantially higher than European fertility. The Social Security
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Figure 1
Projected Old Age Dependency Ratios with 95% Probability Intervals

Source: Based on a probabilistic population projection by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994, Table 2).

Actuary’s long-run assumption for fertility, 1.9 births per woman, is reasonable, but
the assumed range of 1.6 to 2.2 births per woman seems narrow.
Many people believe that higher immigration could ease the projected problems of Social Security and Medicare, and in fact it could, if we take into account
the contributions of the future descendants of immigrants as well (National Research Council, 1997, p. 107–110). However, the effect is very small, because immigrants grow old, too. In the Social Security projections, the long run effect of
varying the immigration assumption is only one-fourth as great as for varying the
fertility assumption, and less than a sixth of the effect of varying the mortality assumption (Office of the Chief Actuary, 1996). The role of immigrants and their
descendants in helping to support the aging baby boom looms large in calculations
of the net fiscal impact per immigrant (National Research Council, 1997, ch. 7),
but it remains small in the context of Social Security and Medicare.
Mortality Decline in the United States During the 20th Century
As a starting point, it is useful to consider the history of mortality decline in
the United States during the 20th century. The pace of mortality decline has varied,
as shown by data from the Social Security Administration in Table 1. During one
subperiod, 1954–68, the age-standardized male death rate actually rose. The dates
in the table were presumably chosen not randomly but rather to maximize the
variation, and so the marked contrasts in rates should be interpreted with caution.
However, the figures in the table do not give a strong impression of either accelerating or decelerating rate of decline.
Even when age-specific mortality declines at unchanging rates, there is a built-
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Table 1
Annual Percentage Rate of Decline in
Age-Adjusted U.S. Death Rates
(by sex for selected periods)
Period

Males

Females

1900–1936
1936–1954
1954–1968
1968–1982
1982–1991
1900–1991

0.8
1.6
00.2
1.8
0.8
1.0

1.0
2.5
0.8
2.1
0.5
1.38

Source: Social Security Administration (1996).
Note: This is the rate at which the crude death rate
would have declined for a population with the age
distribution of the 1990 U.S. population subject to
the age-specific death rates of each period.

in tendency for gains in life expectancy to slow down. This happens because over
time the lives saved by falling death rates are increasingly at older ages where only
a few years of life are thereby added, in contrast to lives saved in childhood. In the
United States, the overall age-adjusted death rate declined at virtually the same rate
from 1900 to 1947 and from 1947 to 1994 (.0118 versus .0111).1 However, life
expectancy increased by 19.4 years in the first period, but only by 8.5 years in the
second period (Office of the Chief Actuary, 1996, pp. 9–10, 15–16). Of course,
death rates might begin to decline more rapidly in the future, particularly at older
ages, which could forestall the deceleration of rising life expectancy. But if historical
trends continue, then gains in life expectancy will continue to slow.
Forecasting Mortality
It is remarkable that the rate of decline of U.S. mortality, adjusted for age, has
been fairly constant over broad periods in the 20th century. But what implication
should be drawn about mortality declines in the future? Some analysts have argued
forcefully that the pace of declines will slow, as life expectancy approaches an effective biological upper limit of about 85 years (Fries, 1980; Olshansky et al., 1990).
Others believe that a life expectancy of 100 might be attained by the middle of the
next century, if not sooner (Ahlburg and Vaupel, 1990; Manton, Stallard and Tolley,
1991).2
1

In this case, the age standardized death rate results from applying the age-sex specific death rates of
each year times the proportion of the population by age and sex in the 1980 population. See Social
Security Administration (1992, pp. 3–4).
2
For a general discussion of methods of forecasting mortality, see Lee and Skinner (1996).
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As a benchmark, assume that mortality will continue to decline in the future
at each age at the same rate at which it declined between 1900 and the present.
This is close to the method proposed by Lee and Carter (1992), who forecast that
expected length of life will rise to 86 years in 2065.
The mortality forecasts prepared and used by the Social Security Administration are done rather differently, and foresee smaller gains. Their recent forecasts
give a life expectancy of 81.2 years in 2065, and 81.8 years in 2080 (Board of Trustees, 1998, p. 60). Within the range of forecasts made in recent years for the United
States, some of which will be discussed below, this is definitely at the low end. The
forecasts are based for initial years on extrapolation of recent age-specific trends,
but these are assumed to move within 25 years to slower ultimate rates of decline.
Thus, the mortality rate for those in the 0–14 age bracket declined at 3.27 percent
per year from 1900–1991, but is projected to decline only 1.52 percent per year
from 1995 to 2080. Similarly, the mortality rate for the 15–64 age bracket actually
declined 1.39 percent per year from 1900–1991, but is projected to decline just .68
percent per year from 1995 to 2080. Only for the 85 and older group is the historical
decline in mortality rates of .54 percent per year fairly close to the forecast decline
of .49 percent. Of course, over periods of time approaching a century, these small
annual percentages compound into large differences. The rationale for the projection of decelerating mortality decline is the expectation that progress against certain specific causes of death is less likely in the future (Office of the Chief Actuary,
1992, p. 6; 1996, pp. 8–14).
The Social Security forecasts are premised on a slowdown in mortality decline
at ages below 85. Some support for this premise can be found in Table 1, which
showed that in the 1980s mortality declined much more slowly than in the 1970s.
More generally, might U.S. declines in mortality be slowing as life expectancy approaches an upper limit, making it increasingly difficult for medical advances to
achieve gains?
If so, these arguments should apply to mortality decline in other low mortality
countries. The United Kingdom, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Japan all
have low mortality and also have excellent data on mortality in old age (Horiuchi
and Wilmoth, 1995, Table 1). Life expectancy in the United Kingdom is similar to
that in the United States. In Japan and Sweden, it is three or four years higher than
in the United States. France and the Netherlands fall in between. The fact that
citizens of other nations experience considerably higher life expectancy than Americans is some evidence that the United States will not immediately bump into some
biologically-imposed upper limit on life expectancy. According to projections of the
Social Security Administration, not until 2051, or 53 years from now, will the United
States attain the life expectancy of 80.4 years which is observed for Japan in 1996
(Board of Trustees, 1998, p. 60).
Further evidence from the international data against the notion that life expectancies are hitting an upper limit is that the rate of mortality decline among
older age groups has remained high, even in the countries that already have life
expectancies as high or higher as the United States. For older males, the rates of
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mortality decline projected by the Social Security Administration are substantially
lower than those experienced in the five countries considered by Horiuchi and
Wilmoth (1995) over the period 1975–79 to 1985–89, with the single exception of
75–79 year-old males in the Netherlands. The projected declines for U.S. males are
only half as rapid as the average for these five populations in the past at 60–64, and
only a third as great as the average at 75–79. For females, the contrast is even
greater, with projected rates of decline that are less than a third of the average at
60–64, and less than a fifth of the average at 75–79.3
In a notable article, Kannisto et al. (1994) present evidence on rates of mortality
decline from 19 countries with reliable data on mortality among the oldest old; that
is, ages 80–100. They find (p. 794): ‘‘In most developed countries outside of Eastern
Europe, average death rates at ages above 80 have declined at a rate of 1–2 percent
per year for females and 0.5–1.5 percent per year for males since the 1960s.’’ By
contrast, the Social Security Administration projections imply a decline at only 0.5
percent, less than one-half the average pace in the Kannisto et al. sample. While U.S.
death rates among the oldest old are indeed lower than those of other developed
countries (Manton and Vaupel, 1995), there is little evidence that countries with higher
death rates experience more rapid declines in those rates (Kannisto et al., 1994).
Furthermore, rates of decline at these older ages have been accelerating throughout
the 20th century, not slowing (p. 799–802).
These international comparisons provide evidence that U.S. mortality decline
is not yet pushing up against biological limits, or against limits imposed by already
existing medical technology. In our view, the central Social Security Administration
forecasts of mortality decline are far too low.
Fiscal Implications of Falling Mortality
How does mortality decline affect retirement systems? Analysts often focus on
changes in life expectancy at age 65, which has risen by 50 percent, from 11.7 years in
1900 to 17.2 in 1994. But this is only part of the story. The probability at birth of
reaching age 65 has increased by 60 percent, and these incremental retirees also contribute incremental years of work before retirement. The most useful single number
for assessing the effect of mortality decline on retirement systems is the ratio of expected years lived during retirement to expected years lived during the working years.
Between 1900 and 1997, this ratio doubled from .17 to .34, a change twice as great as
the proportional change in life expectancy at 65 over the same period.
Figure 2 displays a survival function; that is, the probability at birth of surviving
3

We should note that the average rates of decline for the same countries at the earlier dates 1955–59
to 1965–69 are similar for females age 60–64, but only 60 percent as fast for the 75–79 age bracket,
leaving the qualitative conclusion unchanged; the Social Security Administration projected rate of decline is still only about a third of the average international rate. For males, however, the picture is
different. The average rate of decline of mortality for males age 60–64 from 1955–59 to 1965–69 was
only 0.15 percent per year in the international sample, far lower than the Social Security Administration
projection, and at age 75–79 it was only 0.41 percent per year, slightly lower than the Social Security
Administration projection.
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Figure 2
Probabilities of Survival from Birth to Each Age in 1994 and Projected to 2065,
and Their Difference

Note: Person years gained is given by the difference between the two survival curves. The area under the
person years gained line equals the gain in life expectancy between 1994 and 2065, which is 10.5 years.
The survival curves are from period life tables for sexes combined.
Source: Calculated from Lee and Carter (1992) and Office of the Actuary (1996).

to a given age. The two solid lines show the survival function for 1994, with a life
expectancy of 75.5 years, and the survival function as forecast for 2065 by Lee and
Carter (1992), with a life expectancy of 86 years. The difference between these two
curves, plotted as the dotted line in the figure, gives the expected change in the
person years of life lived at each age over this period. It is striking that 76 percent
of the gains in person years lived are expected to occur after age 65. However,
important gains will also occur during the working years, with a 22 percent increase
in person years lived. These gains in the working years tend to increase earnings
and the tax base, while gains at older ages tend to increase the cost of benefits
provided. Gains before age 20 are very small, and can be ignored for our purposes.
The implications of these changes for Social Security have been simulated,
using a dynamic model that builds on cross-sectional age schedules for payroll tax
contributions and Social Security benefits (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1997a, b). These
age schedules can be suitably modified over time to reflect productivity growth and
legislated changes in the normal retirement age; for example, under current law,
the normal retirement age for Social Security will rise from 65 to 67, with the phasein complete by 2025. The simulation uses the Social Security Administration ‘‘middle’’ assumptions as of 1996 for fertility (1.9 children per woman), immigration
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(900,000 per year), real productivity growth (1 percent per year), and real interest
rate for the trust fund (2.3 percent per year) (Board of Trustees, 1996). It uses the
mortality model from Lee and Carter (1992) to generate different trajectories of
mortality decline, attaining life expectancies in 2070 of 81, 87, 90, and 100 years.4
The first corresponds closely in life expectancy to the Social Security Administration
‘‘middle’’ projection, the second to the Lee and Carter (1992) point forecast, and
the third and fourth to hypothetical scenarios of a more rapid mortality decline.
We wish to use this simulation model to examine the fiscal implications of
mortality change for the Social Security system. However, before we do, we must
consider the various measures that are used to assess the long-term finances of the
system. One approach is to project the trust fund balance implied by current policies. A different strategy is to specify the year when the trust fund runs out of
money, which for Social Security is 2032 (Board of Trustees, 1998). Neither measure
gives a good sense of what magnitude of reform would be necessary to address the
problem; indeed, giving the year of projected insolvency doesn’t even give much
information about the size of the problem.
Another indicator is the long-term actuarial balance, as measured by the
amount by which the payroll tax rate would have to be increased immediately and
permanently, to leave a balance in the trust fund after 75 years equal to one year’s
expected costs. Under Social Security Administration’s middle assumptions, the
long term actuarial balance is about 2.2 percentage points, meaning that the payroll
tax rate for the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Fund would have
to be raised from 12.4 percent to 14.6 percent.5 This measure is a useful one, but
it has a serious problem arising from the finite horizon. It conceals the fact that
even after payroll taxes were raised by 2.2 percentage points, by 2070 the annual
costs of the OASDI system would exceed revenue (from taxes plus interest on the
trust fund) by nearly 40 percent, or by 1.8 percent of GDP (calculated from Board
of Trustees, 1996, p. 187). This would leave the Social Security Administration in
2071 with some unpleasant choices.
A different picture emerges if we ask what tax rate would be necessary each
year to maintain the trust fund at a level exactly equal to the following year’s expenditures. This is the necessary tax rate in a pure pay-as-you-go system, with only
a minimal trust fund. This tax rate can change every year. This is the measure we
will calculate with the help of the dynamic simulation model described above. The
results are given in Table 2, which shows tax rate trajectories of this sort, based on
different mortality trajectories, but with the same assumptions about fertility, real
productivity growth, and real interest rates as before.
For all mortality scenarios, tax rates are initially lower than the actual current
rate of 12.4 percent, because the current level generates surplus revenues. This

4

This is done by suitably modifying the rate of drift in the autoregressive equation for k, the mortality
index, in the Lee-Carter method. We have not used the model to generate life expectancies as high as
100 years in the past, and the implied age distributions have not been verified this far out of sample.
5
A similar calculation can be done for the necessary reduction in benefits (Burtless, 1997).
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includes both the employer and employee share of the tax, and includes all Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance—that is, the OASDI fund. As time passes,
however, tax rates must rise to provide benefits for the aging population, reflecting
the effects both of mortality decline and of trends in fertility and immigration. Even
under the Social Security Administration middle projection (row one of Table 2),
with slow mortality decline, the tax rate would need to increase from 12 percent in
2000 to 20 percent by 2070. Most of this big increase is due to past fertility change,
including the size of the baby boom generations. The Lee-Carter (1992) point
forecast (row 2 of Table 2) would require 2070 taxes to be 4 percentage points
higher than the rate projected under the Social Security Administration. If life
expectancy instead were to rise to 90, then taxes would need to rise to 27 percent
of payroll. And if life expectancy were to rise to 100 years by 2070, then Social
Security taxes alone would have to rise to 32 percent of payroll. Clearly, uncertainty
about the future course of mortality entails very substantial uncertainty about the
future finances of the Social Security system.6
The Social Security Administration provides another convenient measure
of the impact of demographic change: the amount by which retirement age
would have to increase to keep the ratio of those above the retirement age to
those between age 20 and the age of retirement equal to its level in 1995 (Office
of the Chief Actuary, 1997, p. 129–130). The current mean age of retirement is
close to 63; the corresponding ratio of those 63 and over to those 20–62 is .25.
To achieve that ratio of .25 in 2070 under the ‘‘middle’’ Social Security Administration forecast assumptions, the retirement age would have to be 72, fully nine
years greater! Under the ‘‘high’’ cost set of assumptions of the Social Security
Administration, the retirement age would have to be 76. Remember that the
normal retirement age for Social Security is currently legislated to increase from
65 to 67 by 2025. If the actual retirement age also increased by two years (an
unlikely event), this would comprise less than half of the five-year increase necessary to keep the dependency ratio constant by 2025, and only two-ninths of
the total increase needed by 2070.
The above simulations use the Lee-Carter (1992) model to generate the age
distribution of mortality corresponding to each level of life expectancy. Relative
to these Lee-Carter age distributions, Social Security assumes relatively smaller
gains in person years lived in working ages and greater gains in old age, due to
their treatment of mortality decline at younger ages, as discussed earlier. Thus

6

The annual reports of the Board of Trustees of the SSA indicate that an increase of 2.2 percentage
points in the payroll tax rate would achieve actuarial balance of the system through 2070 (Board of
Trustees, 1998, p. 3). This may appear to contradict the results of the first row of Table 2, which suggests
a rise of 8.5 percentage point, for a very similar set of economic and demographic assumptions. Despite
appearances, these figures are not inconsistent. The 2.2 percentage point increase is immediate, and
would equalize the present value of taxes and benefit payments through 2070. As noted in the text, it
would result in the accumulation and decumulation of a large reserve fund, and it would leave the system
losing money rapidly in 2070. The yearly balanced budget assumption is very different.
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Table 2
Balanced Budget Tax Rates for Social Security Under Different Future Mortality
Trajectories
Life Expectancy in 1970 in Years
81 (SSA Middle Projection)
87 (Lee-Carter Point Projection)
90
100

2000

2030

2050

2070

.12
.12
.12
.12

.17
.19
.19
.22

.18
.21
.23
.27

.20
.24
.27
.32

Note: Tax rate is for OASDI only, and is estimated to equalize revenues and benefits yearly. SSA assumptions (Board of Trustees, 1996) are as follows: real productivity growth at 1 percent per year, real interest
on the trust fund at 2.3 percent per year; TFR is 1.9; and the normal retirement age changes according
to current legislation. Tax rate in 2000 is lower than current level, because the current level generates
a surplus.

the Social Security age distribution assumptions for mortality yield higher old age
dependency ratios for a given level of life expectancy.
There is considerable uncertainty about every one of the factors we have discussed. The most common means for representing the uncertainty of a forecast is
to present alternate scenarios. This approach has severe limitations: probabilities
are not given; fluctuations are ruled out; extreme and simplistic assumptions about
covariances of shocks are required. For example, consider the 1995 projections by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1996). Contrasting its ‘‘Highest’’ and ‘‘Lowest’’
projections for the year 2050, we find that the working age population (18–64) has
a range of plus or minus 26 percent; the retirement age population (65/) has a
range of plus or minus 27 percent, while their ratio, the old age dependency ratio,
has a range of only plus or minus 1 percent! The Census report does an excellent
job of providing many alternative scenarios, but problems like this are intrinsic to
this method.
In Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997b), uncertainty about mortality and fertility
trends, as well as productivity growth rates and interest rates, is accounted for
explicitly in a stochastic forecast model. Their 95 percent confidence intervals
for the Social Security Trust Fund balance show exhaustion between 2014 and
2037, and the balance in 2070 ranges from negative $6 trillion to negative $60
trillion (in 1994 dollars). One of the most striking results is that even with an
immediate 2 percentage point increase in the payroll tax rate, Lee and
Tuljapurkar find there would still be a 75 percent probability of trust fund exhaustion before 2070. (Recall that according to Social Security calculations, an
immediate 2.2 percentage point increase in taxes should put the system in long
run balance.) Including the Medicare trust fund in the stochastic simulations
would increase the uncertainty about the solvency of government programs for
the elderly even further.
Figure 3 shows the probability distribution for the pay-as-you-go tax rates as
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Figure 3
Pay-As-You-Go Tax Rate for Social Security
(probability distribution by selected quantiles)

Source: Reproduced from Figure 14 of Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997b). Based on a stochastic projection.
The payroll tax for OASDI is assumed to remain at 12.4 percent until the trust fund drops to 100 percent
of the following year’s expenditure level, and thereafter the tax rate is adjusted to maintain the trust
fund at that level.

described earlier. By 2070, this interval extends from 15 percent to 34 percent of
taxable payroll. By assumption, all trajectories remain at the currently legislated
level of payroll tax until the trust fund declines to equality with the projected funds
necessary for the following year’s expenditures, which is why all the lines have a
horizontal component at 12.4 percent. Thereafter, they rise as necessary to maintain
this trust fund level.

Forecasting Disability and Health Status
The retirement experience for the baby boom retirement cohort will depend
not just on their numbers, but also on their health. In this section, we consider
whether people in the next century can look forward to an active, healthy retirement or to a relatively frail and inactive one, and the implications of such changes
for the Medicare trust funds.
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Trends in Disability
The overall level of disability faced by the elderly is determined by two counterbalancing trends. At any given age, prevalence of morbidity and disability have
declined, tending to reduce the costs of providing health care and ancillary services
for elderly people. However, the elderly, and in particular the oldest old, are expected to be among the fastest growing segments of the population for the foreseeable future, tending to increase the absolute numbers of frail or chronically ill
elderly people requiring outpatient or institutional care (Schneider and Guralnik,
1990).
One problem with predicting how disability will evolve over the next few decades is the absence of any unique definition of disability. Objective medical measures are imperfectly correlated with functional ability, while more subjective selfreported measures of disability may depend on economic factors such as disability
insurance benefits, or may evolve over time according to changing social norms.
For example, Wolfe and Haveman (1990) show that predicted disability rates for a
male older white widower changed from 9.3 percent in 1962 to 33.4 percent in
1973, down to 23.6 percent in 1980, and back up to 32.6 percent in 1984. It seems
likely that variations of this sort reflect a changing notion of what it means to be
disabled. Waidmann, Bound and Schoenbaum (1995) found an increasing prevalence in self-reported disability during the 1970s and a decline in the 1980s, which
they attributed in part to better medical care resulting in higher levels of diagnosis
and treatment.
Most recent studies of disability have measured functional ability in terms of
ADLs, or ‘‘activities of daily living’’ such as eating, dressing or bathing, or IADLs,
‘‘instrumental activities of daily living’’ such as light housework, meal preparation
or money management. But even these measures may not measure intrinsic disability (Nagi, 1991; Vebrugge and Jette, 1994). For example, Freedman and Martin
(1998) point out that refurbishing an apartment or bathroom to make it
handicapped-accessible could improve the resident’s ADL measure without affecting the underlying medical disability; they suggest more intrinsic measures such as
the ability to walk three blocks. Choosing among these measures of disability is
difficult because we don’t know which one best predicts the progression of frailty
and health care expenditures.
Given the degree of confusion about measurement issues, it is reassuring that
most studies point to a long-term decline in the prevalence of disability.7 Manton,
Stallard and Liu (1993a, b), and Manton, Corder and Stallard (1993, 1997) used a
variety of statistical approaches on longitudinal data from 1984 through (most recently) 1994, and found a considerable secular decline in age-adjusted ADLs and
IADLs over this period. For example, if the same age-specific disability rates had
prevailed in 1994 as in 1982, then the overall disability rate would have been

7

Crimmins, Saito and Reynolds (1997), however, find minimal and sometimes inconsistent reductions
in disability.
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24.9 percent, instead of the actually realized 21.9 percent (Manton, Corder and
Stallard, 1997). More recently, Freedman and Martin (1998) used data from the
Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to measure changes in more
intrinsic functioning from 1984 to 1993. They estimated more than 10 percent
declines in the fraction of people over age 50 who experience difficulty in performing tasks such as walking or reading the newspaper.
There is also evidence that these trends have been continuing for a number
of years. Fogel (1994) compared pension medical records of Civil War veterans in
1910 with World War II veterans at similar ages, and found dramatic declines in
the prevalence of musculoskeletal, digestive and circulatory diseases.8 Using similar
data, Costa (1996) found a dramatic increase in the ‘‘body mass index’’ or the ratio
of weight to height. Her results suggested that had body mass index rates in the
1900s been similar to those in the 1980s, labor force participation rates among the
men at the turn of the century would have been 6 percentage points higher.
Supposing that the trend toward reduced disability continues into the next
century, how large might the reduced disability dividend be for future Medicare
financial forecasts? We can provide an illustrative measure of how Medicare spending might change by matching average Medicare spending by level of disability
(Manton, Stallard and Liu, 1993b) with the estimated change in the incidence of
disability during 1982–94 (Manton, Corder and Stallard, 1997). The predicted 14
percent decline in the incidence of disability during 1982–94 translates to a decline
of 6 percent in Medicare spending, or an annual reduction in real growth of 0.5
percent over the 12-year period.9 The cost saving is proportionately smaller than
the disability reduction because even the non-disabled account for significant Medicare spending; $2,292 per capita in 1991 (Manton, Stallard and Liu, 1993b). Were
this 0.5 percent reduction in the annual growth rate of Medicare expenses to continue for 55 years, the level in 2052 would be lower by 32 percent than it would
otherwise have been—certainly a significant saving to the Medicare budget.
But this potential saving could be offset by other unexpected developments.
First, if actual life expectancies are substantially longer than currently predicted by
the Social Security Administration, the larger number of elderly people could easily
swamp the projected savings from the reduction in disability. However, we do not
expect longer life expectancy to have serious adverse effects on the long-term Medicare budget. In a longitudinal study, Lubitz, Beebe and Baker (1995) found that
people who live to age 90 account for $63,000 in lifetime Medicare expenditures,

8

However, Liebson et al. (1992) suggest that reporting bias may overstate measured secular declines in
disease-specific incidence rates.
9
We used 1991 Medicare expenditures for ages 65/, the two bottom panels in Table 6 of Manton,
Stallard and Liu (1993), merged with the changes in the incidence of disability from 1982 to 1994 from
Table 1 in Manton, Corder and Stallard (1997). The definitions of disability were not exactly the same
in the two groups; we matched the classifications as follows: a) nondisabled with nondisabled; b) IADL
impaired with mild cognitive impairment; c) moderate IADLs with 1–2 ADLs; d) physical impairment
with 3–4 ADLs; e) frail and highly frail with 5–6 ADLs; and f) institutional with institutional.
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not much higher than the $55,000 accounted for by people living to age 79.10
Lubitz, Beebe and Baker simulated Medicare expenditures for the year 2020, and
found that the pure effect of an 8 percent increase in lifespan past age 65 (from
17.7 to 19.1 additional years) was only a 2 percent increase in Medicare spending.
Although health care expenditures rise with age, this is largely because the proportion dying also rises with age, and a high proportion of costs is incurred in the
last few years of life. Declining mortality only postpones these costs, and can lead
to cost reductions at earlier ages.
These projections of Medicare spending, however, exclude nursing home
care, which is not generally paid for by Medicare. Current estimates of the elderly nursing home population based on Social Security Administration population projections range between about 2.5 and 3.5 million people by 2020 (Manton, Stallard and Liu, 1993a; Wiener, Illston and Hanley, 1994; Schneider and
Guralnick, 1990). These different point estimates, however, probably do not
reflect the true uncertainty underlying future nursing home populations. Currently, only 24 percent of the disabled elderly are in institutions, with the rest
cared for by family members or public programs (Soldo and Freedman, 1994).
A modest increase in that proportion, because of fewer family caregivers for
aging baby boomers, could have large proportional effects on the demand for
institutional facilities or home health services. Such a development would have
a greater impact on Medicaid, which pays for a substantial fraction of nursing
home care, but it would also increase the demand for Medicare-financed home
health care (Ettner, 1994).

Predicting Health Care and Medicare Costs
In the shorter term, the Medicare crisis is not because of increasing numbers
of old people. The crisis is because of increasing real per capita health care expenditures. Specific diseases are being treated more intensively and with ever-greater
levels of technology. Cutler and McClellan (1996), for example, showed that the
increased cost of treating heart attacks has come from the increased use of surgical
intervention, either through angioplasty (a balloon introduced by catheter into the
heart which is then expanded to ‘‘crack’’ plaque in narrowed arteries) or through
bypass surgery. The cost per surgical procedure has actually declined. Nevertheless,
surgery is now deemed appropriate for an ever-larger percentage of patients with
heart attacks and ischemia.
Whether greater technological innovations (and expenses) will continue is the
10

One might expect that in present value terms, the 90 year-old’s expenditures would be less than the
79 year-old’s, because the bulk of expenditures occur further in the future. On the other hand, secular
growth in real Medicare spending would tend to increase spending for the 90 year-old who receives
terminal care 11 years later. When the discount rate is equal to secular growth in Medicare spending
(say 3 percent annually for each), then simple cross-sectional sums are the appropriate present value
measures of Medicare spending by age.
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major source of uncertainty for projections of the Medicare trust funds. Official
long-term predictions by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the
most recent of which was published in 1992, are sobering. Overall, national health
spending is projected to reach 26.5 percent of GDP by 2020 and 32 percent by 2030.
While spending nearly one-third of GDP on health care may appear at first implausible, the forecast is based on conservative estimates of the trend of real health care
spending that stretch back 30 years. Of course, more recent projections would be
likely to reflect the moderation in overall health care expenditures during the mid1990s. According to 1997 Congressional Budget Office projections, Medicare
spending is predicted to rise from 2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 8 percent of GDP
in the year 2035.11
As many observers have noted, the pressures placed on Medicare are considerably more acute than those for Social Security (Kuttner, 1996). Strictly speaking,
the Medicare ‘‘crisis’’ is a crisis for the baby boomers’ parents, and not for the baby
boomers themselves. Yet the trends in medical technology that are fueling the shortterm crisis are clearly crucial for the long-term viability of the Medicare program,
so it is worthwhile to examine prospects for future growth, both short-term and
long-term, more closely.
First, there are some indications of a short-term moderation in health care
expenditures. Real health care costs (including Medicare) rose just 1.0 percent per
year in real terms during the three years 1994–96, down from the 6.6 percent real
increase during 1990 (Ginsburg and Pickreign, 1997). Some research has suggested
the increased role for managed care has contributed to the slowdown in expenditures (Gaskin and Hadley, 1997), while others suggest the slowdown is associated
with employees paying a larger share of their health care expenses, and scaling back
overall utilization (Krueger and Levy, 1997).
On the other hand, Medicare expenditures have continued to rise, most recently by 5 percent in real terms during 1996 (Levit et al., 1998). Expenditures are
projected to rise from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1997 to 3.4 percent in 2008 (CBO,
1998), which is the year when the Medicare trust funds are predicted to run out of
money. Recent proposals by President Clinton to expand coverage to people under
age 65 would increase further the growth in Medicare expenditures, albeit with
growth in sources of revenue.
It might seem inconsistent to project continued long-term growth if the
Medicare trust funds run dry within a decade. We suspect that as the Medicare
trust funds inch closer to depletion, the government will respond not just by
raising more revenue, but by reducing expenditures. This point was underscored
by Getzen (1992), who used OECD data to focus on country-level changes in

11

These projections also largely explain the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1994) simulations which find that
future generations, on present trends, would face 82 percent tax rates. The projected increase in health
care spending from 13.6 percent (current) to 32 percent (in 2035) is amplified into a much larger tax
increase because in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff scenario, future generations end up bearing most of the
additional health care costs for generations currently alive.
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health care costs. He found little evidence that the fraction of the population
over age 65 was correlated with health spending as a share of GDP, or that the
change in the share of the population over age 65 was correlated with the change
in the share of health spending in GDP. In other words, increased demand for
health care is offset by an ‘‘adjustment to budget realities’’ by a reduction in per
capita expenditures.
Where might this adjustment to budget realities take place in the United
States? One possibility is for incremental change, tucking back on reimbursements
here, raising taxes or premiums there. Another possible source of saving comes
from the tremendous variability in Medicare spending by region (Wennberg and
Cooper, 1997). For example, Skinner and Fisher (1997) found that the elderly
population in Miami and Minneapolis had similar levels of health as measured by
rates of (age-sex-race-adjusted) heart attacks, stroke, hip fractures, and overall mortality rates. Yet per capita price- and illness-adjusted Medicare spending in Miami
($7874) was more than twice the per capita spending in Minneapolis ($3722). Adjusting per capita Medicare costs in high-cost regions (with appropriate price and
illness adjustments) to costs in regions like Minneapolis restored the short-term
Medicare trust funds to a healthy balance in 2005. In theory, a voucher plan like
that proposed by Aaron and Reischauer (1995) with payment amounts benchmarked to Minneapolis could solve the short-term Medicare trust-fund crisis, albeit
with possible effects on health care practice patterns (and provider incomes) in
Miami.
There are three other sources of possible slowdowns in Medicare spending.
First, just 11 percent of Medicare enrollees are enrolled in managed care, leaving
room for future cost saving through managed care enrollment. Managed care firms
as well appear less likely to invest in expensive technology (Cutler and Sheiner,
1997). Second, there is an increasing realization that many of the expensive procedures used in modern medicine may not help (or may even harm) the marginal
patient. McClellan, McNeil and Newhouse (1994), for example, found that diagnostic catheterization and subsequent surgery for heart attack patients had little
impact on mortality of the ‘‘marginal’’ patient. A randomized clinical trial designed
to intervene early in the disease management of Veteran’s Administration patients
found that those receiving the intensive treatment actually did worse than the control group (Weinberger, Oddone and Henderson, 1996). Of course, the problem
is to identify clinically which patients are the ones to gain little from the expensive
procedures.
Finally, there is increasing evidence that well-informed patients may not want
interventions that expose them to side effects, like incontinence in the case of
prostate removal or death from complications of the surgery. In a Canadian study,
heart attack patients shown videotapes describing the various options for management of their problem were less likely to choose surgical intervention than the
general Canadian population, and at rates well below those in the United States
(Morgan et al., 1997). Similar results hold for the management of prostate cancer
(Flood et al., 1996). Again, to the extent that patient preferences are given more
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weight in the future, it may be the case that demand for expensive surgical treatment will actually decline.
We recognize the potential for these factors to moderate Medicare growth in
the short-term, and such moderations would, if permanent, have far-reaching implications for the long-term balance of the Medicare trust funds. Still, we expect
technological developments in health care to continue to fuel expenditure growth
(Schwartz, 1987). Even in the shorter-term, the main factor behind increasing
health care costs, particularly in the Medicare program, has been technological
progress towards more advanced diagnostic and surgical techniques, with many
more methods moving from experimental to routine use. For example, some surgeons now use small localized entry points to perform heart surgery so they no
longer need to break ribs and subject the patient to as high a degree of postoperation risk. This promises to increase overall spending if, as is likely, it makes
eligible a larger number of ‘‘gray area’’ patients who wouldn’t have risked the
earlier open-heart surgery.
Another example of technology that is moving past clinical trials is implantable
defibrillators that detect erratic electronic pulses in the heart (ventricular fibrillation) and deliver shocks to regain rhythmic, normally paced heartbeats. There is
increasing evidence that they are highly effective for reducing sudden cardiac death
among high-risk patients; a recent randomized trial was stopped prematurely because the survival outcomes of the patients with the defibrillators were so dramatically better (Nisam, 1997). However, they are also quite expensive, with overall
costs (including maintenance) estimated at $88,000 (Owens et al., 1997). Given
continued improvements in the size of the units and methods of surgical implantation (and hence fewer adverse side effects), we expect an expanding market
among people with lower risks of sudden cardiac death. These types of medical
innovations—expensive and with a large potential market—hold the greatest promise for a steady, long-term increase in the real share of GDP devoted to health care
spending.
Of course, there is nothing that requires technological advancements to cost
more. They could also yield health improvements at reduced costs. In a Scandinavian randomized clinical trial, the cholesterol-lowering drug simvastatin was
shown to reduce the incidence of subsequent coronary events, leading to a reduction in mortality of 30 percent among those with preexisting heart disease
(SSSSG, 1994; Sacks et al., 1996). The cost of the drug treatment was nearly paid
by the consequent reduction in direct (hospital) and indirect (patient able to
return to work) costs, without even accounting for the improvement in longevity
(Johannesson et al., 1997). Some observers (and investors) are optimistic that
new families of drugs can reduce substantially mortality from cancer (Langreth,
1998). Clearly, were technological change as simple as adding folic acid to breakfast cereal (Malinow et al., 1998), technological developments could help control costs. Nonetheless, on balance we suspect that technology will increase the
overall share of GDP spent on health care, albeit at substantially lower rates than
currently projected.
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Conclusion
Will the federal government have to raise taxes to ever higher levels while
slashing Medicare and Social Security benefits? Or will members of the baby
boomer generation enjoy financial golden years as they retire amidst budget surpluses and ever improving health? With all due caution, we suggest that the prospects for longevity are considerably brighter than even those projections deemed
optimistic by the Social Security Administration. It does not seem likely that the
U.S. population will start to bump against biological limits to health, nor does it
seem likely that baby boomers will experience more years of frailty and poor health.
This is the good news for baby boomers.
The bad news is that the Social Security and Medicare trust funds may face
fiscal stress in the next century, regardless of what reforms are taken in this century.
There is a tremendous degree of uncertainty associated with long-term projections;
even a 4 percentage point hike in the payroll tax today leaves a 22 percent chance
of the Social Security system going bankrupt by 2070 (Lee and Tuljapurkar,
1998a,b). The same point holds more forcefully for the Medicare trust funds.
Currently, many proposed Social Security reforms involve a larger role for
equity markets in trust fund balances or in pre-funded employee saving accounts.
These proposals can potentially reduce the risk of default by increasing the rate of
return on Social Security contributions, and by breaking the link between future
fertility rates and trust fund solvency. On the other hand, they add risk because of
uncertainty about the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the next century. Lee and
Tuljapurkar (1998) recently evaluated a policy reform which would increase the
share of equity in the trust fund to 90 percent by 2000, with an assumed average
real rate of return equal to 7 percent. In a deterministic model, this plan places
the Social Security system in balance through 2097. But in the stochastic simulation,
the median date of exhaustion is delayed to only 2045, and there is still a two-thirds
chance of depletion by 2072!
Despite the large risk of Social Security and Medicare trust funds running short
of money, there is considerable uncertainty about how such shortfalls would be
dealt with by future governments. We suggest that the appropriate policy response
to possible trust fund exhaustion, now and in the future, should depend on the
causes of the problem.
One reason why the trust funds could run dry is lagging growth in real wage
rates or poor asset returns. In this case, the younger generations are unexpectedly
worse off, and from a generational perspective, it might be better to cut benefits to
the elderly instead of raising taxes further on the working population.
By contrast, suppose the trust funds are depleted because of low fertility rates
but reasonable economic growth, or because of higher-than-expected frailty in the
elderly population, or because of an outbreak of a virulent strain of influenza that
strikes the working population as well as the elderly (Webster, 1997). In these outcomes, the burden should be born differently. Tax increases on the fortunate (but
perhaps fewer) younger generations would help cushion the retirement for the
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relatively less fortunate elderly population. Still other developments, like increased
demand for institutional care, could gut the Medicaid budget and require crosssubsidization of some sort from Medicare or Social Security trust funds.
A thornier question is what should be done if the Social Security and Medicare
trust funds are troubled because of positive developments: higher-than-expected
lifespans and technological innovations in medical care. As Newhouse (1992) has
noted, the public seems to be more concerned with increased health care costs,
but are less likely to recognize the benefits that such spending has provided. Many
new medical interventions do provide substantial improvements in survival and
functioning (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler, 1996). Should the elderly
be expected to reduce their non-medical consumption in return for the unexpected
improvements in health functioning and lifespan? If these technological developments raise the marginal utility of income for the elderly (because they live longer
and enjoy improved health functioning), then economic theory counsels against
cutting non-medical consumption. On the other hand, the elderly are enjoying a
positive windfall in health functioning, and on equity grounds shouldn’t they be
willing in return to reduce non-medical consumption? One possible policy response
to increased longevity and improved health functioning is to increase the retirement age; this would minimize the necessity for reducing benefits but ensure that
the generations who are living longer are also paying more into the Medicare and
Social Security systems.
Steuerle (1998) has argued that it makes little sense to ‘‘straightjacket’’ future
expenditures without knowing whether the future government could better spend
its money elsewhere. We agree; how the government responds to the Social Security
and Medicare financing problem should depend on whether the crisis is caused by
unexpectedly high levels of frailty or unexpected extra years of disability-free retirement for the baby boom generation.

Appendix
Stochastic Forecasting Methods for Mortality, Population, and
Social Security
In this paper, we draw at several points on results of newly developed stochastic forecasts of mortality, population and its age distribution, and of the
long term finances of the Social Security system. Each builds on the preceding.
The stochastic mortality forecasts (Lee and Carter, 1992) are based on the
model: ln(mx,t) Å ax / ktbx / ex,t, where mx,t is the death rate for age x in year t,
ax and bx are parameters for each age x, and kt is a parameter for each year t.
This model is fit to U.S. data back to 1900. The resulting time series for kt is
modeled as a random walk with drift, and forecast accordingly. Using the estimated equation above, the forecasts of age specific death rates and their prob-
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ability distributions are derived, and used to generate forecasts of life expectancy. The basic model can also be used to generate survival curves corresponding to any given life expectancy, by varying k deterministically until the implied
life expectancy corresponds to the target. A fitted stochastic model of fertility
(Lee, 1993) is developed in a very similar way.
Net migration is taken as given by the Social Security intermediate assumption
(900,000 per year). Stochastic population forecasts (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1994)
are generated from an initial population age distribution by repeated stochastic
simulations of the evolution of the population, based on Monte Carlo methods and
the stochastic models of fertility and mortality just described. The set of stochastic
population simulations is the basis for stochastic forecasts of Social Security finances
(Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998a, b). In addition, simple constrained mean time series
models are used to fit and forecast the time series of productivity growth rates and
real interest rates. These, together with cross-sectional estimates of age profiles of
payroll tax payments and benefits received, which are suitably modified by productivity growth and policy changes, form the basis for the Social Security projections.
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funded by NIA Grant AG00752. We are grateful to David Cutler, Linda Martin, Timothy
Miller, Andrew Samwick, Eugene Steuerle, John Wennberg, and Stephen Zeldes for very helpful
suggestions. Brad De Long, Alan Krueger, and Timothy Taylor provided extensive comments
which improved the paper substantially.
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